This is ENDNOTE 3 FROM Peter Kurrild-Klitsgaard: An empirical example of the Condorcet paradox of voting in a large electorate Public Choice 107 (2001) 135-145. --- Classic examples are Riker's (1965; 1982; 1986) analysis of the fate of the DePew amendment in the US Senate in 1911 and the Powell amendment in the US House of Representatives in 1956, where he demonstrated the likely existence of a cycle by reconstructing the preferences of the various fractions. Similarly, Blydenburgh (1971) detected one instance of the paradox in the US House of Representatives in 1932 and another in 1938. Lewin(1996: 65ff; 1998: 200ff) hypothesized that a general cyclical collective preference existed among the Swedish political parties prior to the formation of the log-rolling coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the Agrarian Party in 1933. Lagerspaetz (1993;1997) studied ten presidential elections by the Finnish electoral college and found two,possibly three, examples of the empirical occurrence of cyclical collective preferences(1931, 1937 and 1956). More recently, Vergunst (1996) identified a likely instance of the paradox in a case treated in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament in 1995, and in a 1998 study, Marcel Van Dam reportedly found another in a case treated in the same body in 1996. For other studies of the empirical relevance of the paradox of voting, see, e.g, Riker (1958), Jamison (1975), Van den Doel (1979) and Dobra (1983). --- Blydenburgh, J.C. (1971). The closed rule and the paradox of voting. Journal of Politics 33:57-71 Dobra, J.L. (1983). An approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes: An update and extension. Public Choice 41: 241-250. Jamison, D.T. (1975). The probability of intransitive majority rule: An empirical study. Public Choice 23: 87-94 Lagerspaetz, E. (1997). Social choice in the real world II: Cyclical preferences and strategic voting in the Finnish presidential elections. Scandinavian Political Studies 20: 53-67. Lewin, L. (1996). Votera eller F\"orhandla? Om Den Svenska Parlamentarismen. Stockholm:Fritzes. Lewin, L. (1998). Majoritarian and consensus democracy: The Swedish experience. Scandinavian Political Studies 21: 195-206 Riker, W.H. (1958). The paradox of voting and congressional rules for voting on amendments. American Political Science Review 52: 349-366. Riker, W.H. (1965). Arrow’s Theorem and some examples of the paradox of voting. In J.M.Claunch (Ed.), Mathematical applications in political science, Vol. I. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press: 41-60. Riker, W.H. (1982). Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press. Riker, W.H. (1986). The art of manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Van den Doel, H. (1979). Democracy and welfare economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Vergunst, N.P. (1996). Besluitvorming over kerncentrale Borssele: Een analyse van destemparadox in de Nederlandse politiek. Acta Politica 31: 209-228