

An Introduction to
the Electoral Systems Used in Chinese Village Elections

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ABSTRACT

The passage of the *Organic Law of the Village Committees of the People's Republic of China (Trial)* in 1987 empowered Chinese peasants to directly elect their village committee members. It is, however, a challenging task to formulate an electoral system to fill 3 to 7 hierarchically ranked positions within the village committees. Besides the principle of direct election of village committee members, the *Organic Law* does not provide any other guidance on election method. The provincial People's Congresses and local governments took the initiative in formulating local election methods. Consequently, electoral systems not only differ among provinces but also differ among villages within the same county. This paper provides a systematic introduction and an evaluation of the various electoral systems used in the Chinese village committee elections.

An Introduction to the Electoral Systems Used in Chinese Village Elections

Most people are surprised to know that in recent years real competitive elections have been held in China. The *Organic Law on the Villagers Committees*, enacted on November 24, 1987, stipulates that the chairman, vice-chairman, and members of village committees are to be elected directly by villagers for a term of three years. By the end of 1997, elections of village committees had been held in most parts of rural China.¹

Village committee elections are significant for two reasons. First, although the village committee is a basic-level administrative unit, its functions are have direct effects on the welfare of the villagers. The specific functions of the village committees include: planning village economic and social development, collecting taxes and fees, managing village budget, allocating collective natural resources such as land, ponds, forest within the administrative boundary of the village, enforcing birth control policies. Therefore, the village committee elections directly affect village development and resource allocation within the village.

Second, the implementation of direct elections of village committee members was an important development in the election history of the Chinese communist system. It was the first time that the law permitted Chinese peasants to directly elect executive officials. The Chinese Communist Party began to hold elections soon after it established the Soviet regime in the Revolutionary Base in Jiangxi province in 1930. These elections, however, only allowed people to vote for representatives who then elected the

¹ Thus far, Guandong, Guanxi, Yunnan, Hainan, Beijing, Shanghai have not passed implementation methods for the village committee elections.

executive officials. During the People's Commune period, according to the *Sixty Regulations on People's Commune* issued by the Chinese Communists in 1962, the cadres of the production team should be elected by the representatives of the team members, not by the members directly.²

Besides the principle of direct election of village committee members, the *Organic Law* does not provide any other guidance on election method. The provincial People's Congresses and local governments took the initiative in formulating local election methods. Consequently, electoral systems not only differ among provinces but also differ among villages within the same county. In this paper, I first provide a systematic introduction of the various electoral systems used in the Chinese village committee elections. I then examine the properties of a unique vote counting method found in China -- the Accumulative Vote (AV) method -- by comparing it to the method proposed by Condorcet in 1785. In addition, I propose a revised AV method to remedy some of its problems.

Before I introduce the various election methods used in the selection of village committee members, it is helpful to provide a historical account of the establishment of the village committees and the politics behind the decision to implement direct elections in village politics.

² In some areas, brigade leaders were directly elected by peasants. See Victor C. Falkenheim, "Political Participation in China." *Problem of Communism* 27, no. May-June(1978): 18-32; John P. Burns, "Election of Production Team Cadres in Rural China, 1958-1974." *China Quarterly* 74(1978): 273-96. John P. Burns, *Political Participation in Rural China*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988.

1. The Historical Background

Prior to 1978, the local government organization is a hierarchy stratified from the commune committee to the brigade committee and then to the production teams. These organizations controlled every aspect of the political, economic, social and cultural life in rural China. This one-sided, vertical and centralized administrative government could work only because there was an economic system in which the means of production is owned by the three levels of administrative units. After the collapse of the People's Commune system in rural China, the adoption of the household-based responsibility system in the late 1970s helped peasants regain autonomy of production and distribution of goods. Under these circumstances, the People's Commune system gradually dissolved and lost its power. In many areas, production brigades were no longer functional (Burns, 1988). In order to cope with this situation, in 1981, peasants in the Luoshan and Yishan areas, Guanxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, voluntarily established village committees to maintain public security, resolve disputes, and manage public affairs in the village. As a way to counter this grassroots autonomy and reestablish authority in rural China, the Chinese central government immediately began to promote the institutionalization of village committees in rural China. *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China* adopted in 1982 confirms that village committees are the basic-level governments in villages. Article 111 of the constitution stipulates that the village committees are self-governing bodies and that the chairman, vice chairman, and commissioners of the village committees are to be elected by local residents.

Prior to the passage of the *Organic Law on the Villagers Committees*, however, village heads were generally appointed by the township government. In many instances,

village meetings were rarely convened and the village heads were corrupt. Villagers often resisted efforts by their leaders to implement important but unpopular directives. Even worse, in some villages, the village Party branch secretary became the executive chief, the chairman of the village committee became an autocrat, and the township officials become dictators. Some farmers described them as follows: “The officials come to the village merely to urge us to pay grain or money, or to force abortion. Some officials even have handcuffs or clubs with them, followed by the policemen. They come to the village to slaughter pigs, catch people, or confiscate houses.” Some farmers tried to get revenge by sabotaging officials’ private properties.³ As a response to this deterioration of organizations and leadership at the rural grassroots, the Legal Affairs Commission of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Ministry of Civil Affairs proposed to reform the village committees.

Peng Zhen, the former Chairmen of the National People’s Congress (NPC) played an important role in introducing direct elections for village committee members. Against the will of the former Premier Zhao Ziyang, who preferred the establishment of village governments, Peng Zhen introduced a bill stipulating that village committee members should instead be directly elected by popular votes. At first, most members of the Standing Committee of the NPC strongly opposed it and the bill was defeated at the committee level. However, Peng Zheng managed to reintroduce the bill to the committee a few months before his retirement from his position as NPC chairman and extensively lobbied members on the committee. As a consequence of his efforts, the bill finally passed the scrutiny of the committee and became law on November 24, 1987. The

³ The Report on the villagers Representative Assemblies in China, Ministry of Civil Affairs, PRC, *Chinese*

implementation of the Organic Law in rural China started in June 1, 1988 (Wang Zhenyao 1993, Li Xueju 1994, Bai Yihua 1995).

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, the powerful Organizational Department of the CCP, in conjunction with some provincial leaders, expressed their strong opposition to introducing direct elections into rural China. They charged that such efforts were "examples of peaceful evolution" and suggested abolishing the plan. At the critical moment, two senior leaders, Peng Zhen and Po Yipo, openly opposed such allegations and defended the project. They even summoned Song Ping, director of the Organizational Department of the CCP to Peng's home to personally rebuke him. As a consequence of their intervention, the project survived the attack from the more conservative elements and direct elections were carried out in rural China.

2. The Electoral Systems of the Chinese Village Committees

The organizational structure of the village committees is inherited from the administrative system of the production brigade created during the People's Commune period. The production brigade was governed by a brigade leader and an administrative committee. The structure of the village committees is similar in that it consists of 1 committee chairman, 1-2 deputy chairmen, and a variable number of members.⁴ The size of the village committees ranges from 3 to 7 members. To provide an introduction to the various electoral systems in rural China, I shall examine three main components of an electoral system: candidate nomination, determination of official candidates, and voting method. Any electoral system used in Chinese village elections is a combination of these

Society Publishing House, p. 43.

⁴ Some village committees have no deputy chairman position.

three components.

A. Candidate Nomination Methods

Based on scrutiny of the 24 provincial guidelines on village elections, I identify nine nomination methods. In Table 1, I provide a summary of the nomination methods used in different provinces.

Table1

Nomination Methods used by the Provinces

Party	Self Nomination Government	Individual	Joint** Nomination	Villager	Villager Nomination	Household*** Group	Election Repre- Branch	Village Repre-	Township Steering
Fujian			5						
Zhejiang			10	Xs					
Gansu		X		X					
Guizhou			10			X			
Hubei				X					
Hunan	X	X		X					
Hebei			10	X	X		X		
Heilongjiang	X		5	X			X		
Liaoning	X	X	10				X		
Qinghai			10	X		10			
Shan/xi			5						
Tianjin			10				X		
Shanxi				X	X		X		
Sichuan			10	X			X		
Jilin	X	X	10	X		10	X		
Henan	X		10	X			X		
Xinjiang			10	X	X		X		
Ningxia	X		10				X	X	
Shandong				X					
Neimeng			10	X					
Anhui			10	X					
Jiangsu			10	X					
Jiangxi				X			X		
Xizang	not specified								

* Every voter is entitled to nominate candidates.

** Minimum # of villagers needed to nominate a candidate.

*** Minimum # of household representatives needed to nominate a candidate.

In some provinces, only one of the nine nomination methods is stipulated in the provincial laws and decrees on the implementation of the Organic Law on the village committees. For example, in Fujian and Shaanxi provinces, joint-nomination by 5 villagers is the only method allowed. Most of the provinces in China, however, allow more than one nomination method. In general, joint-nomination and nomination by villager groups are the most common nomination methods in village elections. Villager groups were originally the basic production teams during the people's commune period. Villagers have thus established extensive contacts and relations within their units. For this reason, most provinces use production units to nominate candidates.

Interestingly, the provincial provisions and decrees on the implementation of the Organic Law on the village committees do not necessarily have superiority over the regulations made by the people's congress at the county level. For example, article 8 of the Zhejiang provincial provision on the implementation of the Organic Law on the village committees states that any ten villagers can jointly nominate a candidate and villager groups can also nominate candidates. But, article 9 of the Methods for Implementing the Organic Law of village committees passed by Xiaoshan, a city adjacent to the capital city of Zhejiang province, contradicts the provincial provision by allowing village party branches to nominate candidates.

There are, of course, also cases in which the county regulations specify more open and democratic nomination methods than what is stipulated in the provincial election laws. For example, article 13 of Jilin province's *Methods for Implementing the Organic Law on the Village Committees of the People's Republic of China* stipulates that village committee candidates can be nominated by the village party branch, by villager groups,

or by ten villagers. The implementation methods adopted by Lishu county in the same province strictly prohibits the party branch from nominating candidates. It only allows individual voters, or ten voters to jointly nominate candidates.

B. Determination of Final Candidates

Not all nominees ultimately appear on the ballot. In most villages, the number of candidates nominated by people or organizations greatly exceeds the number of positions to be filled. Most provincial election laws stipulate that a candidate can be elected only if he obtains more than half of the total votes cast. Therefore, there is a practical need to limit the number of candidates in the general elections. No provincial election laws offer a concrete method to determine the list of official candidates. Uniformly, the provincial provisions only stipulate that “the official candidates should be decided by methods that reflect the majority will.” Specific methods for selecting the official candidates can only be found in rules formulated by the government agencies at the county or township levels. Based on the materials edited by the MCA (1993, 1995, 1996), we can identify four methods used to determine the official candidate lists.

1. The Nomination Vote Method. The list of official candidates is determined by the number of nomination votes each candidate receives. For example, if the village committee has three positions to fill, then the top five or top nomination vote getters become the official candidates. Some prefectures in Liaoning and Jilin provinces use this method. The method used in Hequ county, Shanxi province, is a variation of this method. There, the top two nominees become the official candidates of the committee chairman position, the third and the fourth highest nominees become the official candidates for the deputy chairman position, and the 5th and 6th highest vote-getters

become the candidates for the committee member positions.

2. The Primary Election Method: After the village election steering committee announces the names of the nominees, the village election steering committee organizes a primary election among either voters or village assembly members to select the official candidates.

3. The Consultative Method: This is a variation of the time honored method of three-ups and three-downs. First, candidates are nominated (1st up), then the steering committee announces the tentative list of candidates after it received all the nominations (1st down). The tentative list of candidates then is presented to villager groups for discussion. People's opinions on the tentative list are then presented to the election committee of the village (2nd up). The election steering committee then convenes a consultation meeting attended by members of the election committee, chairmen of the villager groups and the representatives of the voters to produce another tentative list for villager groups to discuss (2nd down). This step is repeated one more time (3rd up and 3rd down) before the final list of candidates are determined by the village committee. The "three-ups and three-downs, and three-announcements" method is still used in Jumadian in Henan province.⁵

4. The Village Party Branch Determines the Official Candidates. The operation of this method is very similar to the consultative method, except that the role of the village election steering committee is now played by the village party branch.

Among these four methods, determination by the party branch is the least democratic one. Determination of official candidates based on nomination votes reflects

⁵ The "three-ups and three-downs" nomination-consultation method is the primary nomination method used

the principles of popular participation, directness, fairness, and openness. In addition, it shortens the election procedure from three to two steps. The primary election method satisfies democratic principles, but the operating costs of the election are higher than are those of the method of nomination votes. The consultative method follows the spirit of the “mass line,” which can be summarized as “from the masses, to the masses” and is the Chinese version of democratic centralism. Although such methods give people an opportunity to have some input in the process, the decision is made by the village election steering committee. This method not only violates the procedural rights of citizens, but also permits election manipulation by incumbent village officials or members of the party branch.

It is not unusual in China to run elections in which the number of final candidates is equal to the number of seats to be filled, because according to their political ideology, elections are only a formality and consensus should have been achieved through deliberations before the elections are held. To simplify presentation, I use the term “competitive election” to refer to those elections in which the number of candidates exceeds the number of positions to be filled, and “non-competitive elections” if the number of candidates is equal to the number of seats. The 1987 Organic Law does not specify whether the number of candidates should exceed the number of seats. Election laws passed by some provinces demand competitive elections, but some provinces still do not prohibit non-competitive elections.

1. Only competitive elections are permitted. Liaoning, Henan, Hunan, Shandong, and Hebei provinces adopted the principle of competitive elections. Allowing only

in the People’s Congress elections. See Zihua Cheng (1981) for a detailed account of this method.

competitive elections can reduce election manipulation by local cadres. In cases where the number of candidates nominated is smaller than the number of positions to be filled, however, the election laws become non-functional. To prevent such situations, the nomination methods used by these provinces are quite open. The method of joint nomination by ten voters is used in Hebei and Henan provinces; the method of nomination by villager groups is used in Shandong, Hunan, and Hebei provinces; and the method of self-nomination is used in Henan and Hunan provinces. These nomination methods tend to produce more candidates than positions, and hence more competitive elections.

2. Competitive elections are the rule and non-competitive elections are the exceptions. Most provinces emphasize that competitive elections should be held but, if the number of candidates is equal or less than the number of positions to be filled, non-competitive elections are permitted. For example, In Zhejiang and Qinghai provinces, the election laws stipulate that “village committee elections, in general, should be competitive. However, depending on the outcomes of candidate nomination and determination of official candidates, elections can be non-competitive.” Quite obviously, this kind of stipulation invites manipulation and fraud. This is true especially in areas where the official candidates are produced through consultation, because township governments or local party branches can manipulate elections by nominating their own candidates to run in the non-competitive elections. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, PRC, in the 1992 village committee elections, in Tongxian county, Zhejiang province, 266 out of 306 villages (86.9%) held non-competitive elections (Wang et al., 1993, p.35).

3. Both competitive and non-competitive elections are permitted. The election law passed by Guizhou province clearly stipulates that the election of committee chairmen can either be competitive or non-competitive, but the election of deputy chairmen and committee members must be competitive.

C. Voting Procedure and Vote Counting Method

Since village committee elections involve three different positions -- committee chairman, deputy chairman, and members, different voting procedures have been used to fill these positions. We can classify them into five different voting procedures.

1. The Chairmanship Method: Voters first elect the chairman, then the newly elected committee chairman appoints the deputy chairman and the committee members.⁶ As a result, only the chairman of the village committee is responsible to the villagers. The advantage of this method is that it promotes efficiency of the village committee. Since the chairman puts together the committee, the committee can be better managed. One possible problem of this method is that the committee might become too powerful if it is not properly checked and balanced. Prior to 1992, the chairmanship method was used in the areas of Tieling city (Liaoning province), Qinggang county (Heilongjiang province), Xiangcheng and Xinzheng counties (Henan province). Because the chairmanship method violates the principle of direct election stipulated in the Organic Law, the MCA does not endorse it.⁷ As a consequence, the Chairmanship Method is now rarely used in China.

⁶ According to the local election laws, another election should be held to elect the deputy chairman and committee members. But this step is often ignored. Instead, the elected committee chairman appoints the deputy chairman and the committee members.

⁷ Director Zhenyao Wang stated the MCA's view on this electoral system in a telephone conversation with the author in March 1997.

2. Simultaneous Elections, One candidate-one position (A sample ballot is included in Appendix A): On the ballot, candidates are divided into three different categories by the types of positions they are running for. No candidate can run for more than one position. Voters elect candidates for these positions simultaneously. One of the shortcomings of this method is that the defeated candidates in a higher position race cannot compete for the lower positions. To correct this problem, some villages use the following method.

3. Sequential Voting (A sample ballot is included in Appendix B): On the election day, the village committee chairman is elected first, then the deputy chairman, and, finally, the committee members are elected. Those candidates who fail to win the chairmanship can compete for the position of deputy chairman in the second round of voting. The defeated candidates for the position of deputy chairman can then run for the positions of committee members. The advantage of this method is that it gives the defeated candidates a chance to run for the lower positions. But in practice, this method poses great difficulties. In some villages it is impossible to have new ballots printed on the election day, so elections can take several days. To lower the cost of voting, some villages use the following method.

4. Simultaneous Elections, Candidates for the Higher Positions are Also Candidates for the Lower Positions (A sample ballot is included in Appendix C): On the ballot, candidates for the committee chairman position are also listed as candidates for the deputy-chairman positions, and all the candidates for the deputy-chairman position are also candidates for the committee member position. When counting votes, if a candidate does not win the committee chairman position, all the votes he receives for that

position can be added to the votes he receives for the deputy-chairman position. The same calculation applies to the committee member position. This method has two possible shortcomings. First, if the winner of the committee chairman position also receives a lot of votes for the deputy-chairman position, then it is likely that no candidate for the deputy-chairman position receives more than 50% of the votes. Second, since the candidates for the higher position are also listed as candidates for the lower positions, to have competitive elections for all three positions, it is only necessary to nominate one more candidate than the number of positions. So this method gives local officials a loophole to limit the number of candidates in the final elections, which lower the competitiveness of the elections.

5. The Accumulative Vote (AV) method -- Simultaneous Elections, One Candidate-Multiple Positions (A sample ballot is included in Appendix D): The AV method is the most surprising discovery I made in my study of Chinese village elections. So far as I can tell, the AV method is a Chinese invention, which allows candidates to compete for all three different types of positions simultaneously. The ballot contains only the names of the candidates without specifying the positions the candidates are running for. The candidates are simultaneously considered for all three types of positions. When voters cast their votes, they specify the positions they expect the candidates to fill. The candidate who receives the highest votes for the position of committee chairman wins the chairmanship. For losers, the votes collected by them as chairman are counted toward the votes for the next position. Therefore, the number of votes an individual receives for the position of deputy chairman is the sum of the votes earned by him for the positions of committee chairman, (assuming that he did not win the position) in addition to the votes

which he gets for the deputy chairmanship. Similarly, the total number of votes a candidate receives for the position of committee member is equal to the number of votes he receives for the position of committee chairman, plus the votes he gets for the deputy chairman position, plus the votes he receives for a committee member position. The AV method is used in some counties in Liaoning province. The advantage of this electoral system is its simplicity. If there are too many viable candidates for a position, however, it is likely that no candidate will receive a majority of the votes. When no candidate receives a majority votes, another election has to be held, as stipulated by the village election implementation methods passed by most provincial People's Congresses.

4. Conclusion

In traditional China, decisions were often made either by the clan elder himself or through lots-drawing other than through elections. The grading system used in the Imperial Examination System, though lack in clearly stipulated standard, was probably the only voting method practiced in China prior to the 20th century. In recent years, with the passage of the Organic Law of Villagers' Committee in 1987, China has been trying to implement villagers' committee elections. Many voting methods have been proposed and experimented in rural China to elect the village committee officials. In this paper, I provide an introduction to these voting systems for two purposes. First, by studying these voting methods, we gain a better understanding of their operations and characteristics. Second, procedurally, we learn about how democratically elections have been conducted in rural China.

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1. 170
 2. 192
 3. 194
 4. 101

Appendix A

临猗县角杯乡西齐永村
 第四届村委会选举
 选票

总张: 657
 有效: 96
 无效: 561
 作废: 14

主任职务 (应选一人) 正式候选人	副主任职务 (应选二人) 正式候选人	委员职务 (应选二人) 正式候选人
毋建刚	毋立春	毋建军
毋笃猛	毋丙福	毋强胜
	毋自强	毋笃正

说明: ① 同意那一位候选人, 就在其姓名上方空格内划○, 不同意不划任何符号。
 ② 选民不同意选票上的候选人, 可以把你同意的人姓名写在要选职务部分后面的空格内, 并在其姓名上方的空格内划○。
 ③ 每一选民只能选一名主任, 二名付主任, 二名委员, 少于等于的有效, 超过的无效。

Appendix B

选民投票须知

根据厦湖府(1997)020号文件精神,为了组织好选民依法行使民主选举权利,现将投票选举有关事项通知如下:

一、投票时间:

- 1、4月8日上午7:00至下午2:00,投票选举村委会主任;
- 2、4月9日上午7:00至下午2:00,投票选举村委会副主任;
- 3、4月10日上午7:00至下午2:00,投票选举村委会委员;
- 4、4月17日上午7:00至下午2:00,投票选举村民小组长和村民代表。

二、投票地点:

选民应在投票时间内到本村民小组“投票站”领取选票和投票。

三、投票程序:

选民先到“领票处”领票,再到秘密“划票间”填票,最后到“投票处”投票。具体如下:

1、**领票处**:选民凭本人“选民证”依次领取1张选票(不能委托),工作人员核对名单,作好记录,并在“选民证”上盖上领票记号。

2、**秘密写票处**:选民秘密划票在“划票间”进行,只允许选民单独入内。“划票间”备有印泥、印戳、钢笔、墨水。根据应选人数,赞成的在候选人姓名上方空格内盖上“○”,不赞成的不划任何符号,另选他人的应在空格栏内写上另选人姓名,并在上方空格内盖上“○”,多选无效。

选民对选票不清楚的,由工作人员给予解释。不识字的如在候选人当中挑选可请代写人讲清楚候选人姓名位置后,自己进入“划票间”盖上“○”;如另选他人的可以请代写人代写,由选民单独在另选人上盖上“○”。

3、**投票处**:选民写票后,应将选票对折,最后到投票处将选票投入“投票箱”,离开投票处。

四、投票要求:

选民应服从工作人员安排,维护投票站秩序,依次投票,不得围观选民填写选票。对扰乱、破坏选举工作的,应予批评教育或行政处理,触犯法律的,要追究其法律责任,确保~~本村~~村委会选举工作顺利完成。

高殿村委会选举领导小组

一九九七年四月八日

禾山镇高殿村委会主任选举选票

符 号			
姓 名	万 国 忠	陈 庆 佳	
说 明	1、主任只选一人，多选无效。 2、同意的在候选人姓名上方空格内划○；不同意的不作任何符号；另选其他选民的应在空格栏内写上另选人的姓名，并在其姓名上方划○；未划符号的无效。		

禾山镇高殿村委会副主任选举选票


第 次

符 号			
姓 名	万 国 忠	张 清 忠	陈 成 斌
说 明	1、副主任只选2人，多选无效。 2、同意的在候选人姓名的上方空格内划○；不同意的不做任何符号；另选其他选民的应在空格栏内写上另选人的姓名，并在其姓名上方划○；未划符号的无效。		

禾山镇高殿村委会委员选举选票

按姓氏笔划为序

符 号					
姓 名	陈 成 斌	陈 秀 月	林 秀 玉	林 湛 成	林 群 田
说 明	1、委员只选4人，多选无效。 2、同意的在候选人姓名的上方空格内划○；不同意的不做任何符号；另选其他选民的应在空格栏内写上另选人的姓名，并在其姓名上方划○；未划符号的无效。				



Appendix C

西张吴乡宏土村第四届村委会换届选举选票

候选职务	主任(应选一人)		
符 号			
候 选 人 姓 名	吴成确	吴俊杰	

候选职务	副主任(应选二人)				
符 号					
候 选 人 姓 名	吴成确	吴俊杰	吕引存	吴天龙	

候选职务	委 员 (应选二名)						
符 号							
候 选 人 姓 名	吴成确	吴俊杰	吕引存	吴天龙	吕宜红	吕仰琴	

说明：

- 1、应选主任一名、副主任二名、委员二名。等于或少于规定名额有效，多于规定名额无效。
- 2、同意那一位候选人，则在其姓名上方空格内划“0”；不同意划“X”。另选其他人的将其姓名填在该职务候选人后面空格内，并在其姓名上方的空格内划“0”，未划符号无效。
- 3、对以上每一位候选人，只能同意一种职务，如划“0”两种职务以上，以最低一种职务计票。
- 4、统计得票时，同一候选人，低职务得票加高职务得票，等于低职务得票总数。

Appendix D

辽宁省新民市选票式样

法哈牛镇 村第五届村委会主任、 副主任、委员选票票样(二)

(按姓氏笔划为序)

姓名																			
主任																			
副主任																			
委员																			

说明:(一)应选主任 名,副主任 名,委员 名。主任差下者自然进入副主任候选人,副主任差下者自然进入委员候选人。等于或少于应选名额有效,多余应选名额此票作废。同意请在候选人姓名下方相应职务空格内划“○”符号,不同意请在候选人姓名下方相应职务空格内划“×”符号。

(二)如另选他人,请在姓名栏后方空格内写上你同意人的姓名,并在下方相应职务空格内划“○”符号。

取材自《中華人民共和國村民委員會選舉工作範例》，第126頁。